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a character and in a condition to be used as contemplated by the contract,
and that the bailor is liable for damages occasioned by faults or defects in
the article. Although the authority is old and related to contract rather than
to tort law, the principle involved applies equally well to the instant case.
The Phillipoff case was available to the Fourth District Court of Appeal as
authority for holding the gas company liable under the doctrine of implied
warranty.

Justification exists for extending the coverage of implied warranty to certain bailment situations as in the instant case where the object bailed was
potentially dangerous and the bailor exercised almost full control over the
bailed article. Although the plaintiffs may recover upon retrial on the issue
of negligence, the importance of this decision is that the court apparently
declined to extend implied warranty protection to any bailee. Thus, the
court may have created a large exception to Florida's expanding coverage of
implied warranty.
JAMES P. HINES

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: FLORIDA TIGHTENS REQUIREMENTS
FOR VEHICULAR SEARCHES
Carterv. State, 199 So. 2d 324 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1967)
Defendant was arrested by city police officers acting on the belief that he
was transporting lottery equipment in his truck. A search of the truck
revealed incriminating lottery tickets and other gambling paraphernalia.
The police did not have a warrant for the arrest or search, although for two
weeks prior to his arrest they had observed defendant making trips between
his home and a gasoline station suspected of supplying gambling equipment.
At his trial for violation of Florida's gambling laws,' defendant objected
to the admission of lottery equipment seized from his truck on the ground
that it was obtained as the result of an unreasonable search in violation of
2the fourth amendment and section 22 of the Florida Declaration of Rights.
On appeal from the Pinellas County Circuit Court, the Second District Court
of Appeal HELD, the evidence was inadmissible because the officers did not
have probable cause for defendant's arrest and, having had reasonable opportunity, should have procured a search warrant.
I.

2.

FLA. STAT. §849.09 (1965).
FLA. CONsT. Deci. of Rights §22.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1967

1

1967]

Florida
Law
Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 2 [1967], Art. 9
CASE
COMMENTS

From the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches
has evolved the general rule that no searches of dwellings may be conducted
except under authority of a warrant issued upon a howing of probable cause
before a judge or magistrate.3 Reflecting this rule, the Florida statutes provide
4
elaborate mechanics for procuring search warrants.
However, exceptions to the general rule have been recognized by Florida
courts where it is reasonable to conduct a search without a warrant. 5 Two
exceptions here applicable include a search made incident to an arrest on
probable cause and a search made of a moving vehicle on probable cause.
The United States Supreme Court recognized in Carroll v. United States0
that there are reasonable searches for which no warrant is required, one such
search being that of a moving vehicle. In Carroll,the Court upheld the stopping and searching of an automobile without warrant where the arresting
officers had probable cause to believe the automobile was carrying contraband. The rationale behind the Court's decision was based on necessity - the
inherent mobility of automobiles makes it difficult to obtain a warrant prior
to a search.
Carroll is the leading case on vehicular searches and has been cited repeatedly by both federal7 and Florida s courts for the proposition that an
automobile search may be made without a warrant if based on probable cause.
It is important to note, however, that the Carroll decision substantially qualifies this broad proposition. In delineating the circumstances under which a
search without a warrant may be made, the Court said "where the securing of
a warrant is reasonably practicable it must be used."9
In the area of dwelling searches, federall ° and Florida" cases have held
that the fact officers have had sufficient opportunity to procure a warrant does
not necessarily render invalid a search without a warrant. The Florida
8. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 522 F.2d 443 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S.
952 (1963); FL.A. STAT. §933.18 (1965).
4. FLA. STAT. §933.01 (1965) states that "any judge" can issue a warrant; §933.02 provides the grounds upon which such search warrants may be obtained and requires that
these grounds be supported by affidavits; §93.05 prohibits issuance of a search warrant
"except upon probable cause supported by affidavit ... naming or describing the person,
place or thing to be searched and particularly describing the property or thing to be
seized ...." Section 988.07 fixes a judicial duty upon a judge or magistrate to examine the
proofs submitted and to be satisfied that "probable cause exists for the issuing of the
search warrant" before it is issued.
5. Four exceptions are generally recognized: (1) where voluntary consent to the search
is given, see Jackson v. State, 182 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1961); (2) where the search is of certain
establishments regulated by state agencies, see Boynton v. State, 64 So. 2d 586 (Fla. 1958);
(8) where the search is incident to a lawful arrest, see Bryant v. State, 155 So. 2d 396 (2d
D.C.A. Fla. 1968); (4) where the search of a vehicle is based on probable cause, see Range
v. State, 156 So. 2d 584 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1968).
6. 267 U.S. 182 (1925).
7. See, e.g., Brinegar v. United States, 888 U.S. 160 (1949); United States v. Roberts, 90
F. Supp. 718 (E.D. Tenn. 1950).
8. Kersey v. State, 58 So. 2d 155 (Fla. 1952).
9. 267 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).
10. United States v. Rabinowitz, 889 U.S. 56 (1950).
11. Casso v. State, f82 So. 2d 252 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1966).
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court grafted this exception to automobile searches in Brown v. State, citing
the Carroll decision as authority, and holding that a vehicular search does
not require a warrant even where it would have been reasonably practicable
to procure one.1 2 This case is directly contra to the warning contained in
the Carroll opinion, which has been adopted by Florida as the statutory law
governing searches of automobiles.1 3 Carterrevitalizes the statutory standards
seemingly overlooked in Brown and other Florida cases.
Though the rule in Carroll and its concomitant admonition have been
explicitly followed in at least one instance where a federal court was applying Florida law, 14 the Florida courts have diluted the rule. Adopting a

half-way stand between Carroll and Brown, the Florida Supreme Court has
held that it would5 be "safer procedure" to procure a warrant prior to
1
searching a vehicle.
The distinction between recommending and requiring a warrant to search
a vehicle where there is sufficient time and opportunity to go before a
magistrate may seem insignificant; however, failure to make the distinction
encourages searches without warrants. The thrust of the fourth amendment
is to encourage the use of warrants wherever practicable to insure that
searches will be reasonable. 16 It is much more desirable, time and circumstances permitting, to have independent judicial determination of the existence
of probable cause than to leave such an inexact criterion to the discretion of
arresting officers. Such loose interpretation of the Carroll decision has not
gone without dissent and critical comment 7 yet until Carter v. State Florida
courts paid little heed to such criticism.
Another trend indicated by Florida decisions is that the requirements for
probable cause, where automobile searches are involved, have been lowered.
Cameron v. State,1 8 reviewing prior decisions, indicated that minimal evidence
is being held sufficient to constitute probable cause for the search of a vehicle
without a warrant. In a subsequent case the court concluded, again upon
reviewing prior decisions, that "[t]he aftermath of the Carroll case in Florida
has been . . . a trend to narrow the concept of immunity against searches

and seizures involving automobiles."' 19
12. 46 So. 2d 479, 481 (Fla. 1950).
13. FLA. STAT. §933.19 (1965).
14. Walker v. United States, 125 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1942).
15. Collins v. State, 65 So. 2d 61, 65 (Fla. 1953).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950) (dissenting opinion);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
17. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Brinegar stated: "the extent of any privilege of
search and seizure without [a] warrant which we sustain . . . officers interpret and apply
themselves and will push to the limit." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 182 (1949).
Dissenters in a recent Supreme Court case, McCray v. State, 87 S. Ct. 1056, 1065 (1967)
stated that "[u]nder the present decision we leave the Fourth Amendment exclusively in the
custody of the police .... What we do today is to encourage arrests and searches without
warrants." Also, a commentor criticized the logic behind Florida law on automobile searches
since the law does not require a warrant to search a vehicle if based on probable cause
even if there were sufficient time and opportunity to procure one. Comment, Search and
Seizure- the Florida Automobile Cases, 10 MIAMii L.Q. 54, 65 (1955).
18. 112 So. 2d 864 (1st D.C.A. Fla. 1959).
19. Miller v. State, 137 So. 2d 21, 23 (2d D.C.A. Fla. 1962).
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Carter v. State tightens the requirements long ago enunciated in the
Carroll opinion, but largely ignored by subsequent Florida decisions. By
requiring not only a showing of probable cause but also a showing that there
was not sufficient opportunity to procure a warrant, the Carter decision infuses new vitality and substance into existing law. While not eliminating
liberal police discretion regarding the existence of probable cause, the Carter
case restricts it within more reasonable bounds. After all, if police officers
do in fact have probable cause for stopping and searching a vehicle and
sufficient opportunity to procure a warrant, they should not be hesitant
to obtain judicial confirmation.
The decision in Carter does not define "reasonable opportunity" to procure a warrant by reference to point in time alone. Only where both time
and circumstances reasonably permit the procuring of a warrant will the fruits
of a search without a warrant based on probable cause be rendered inadmissible as evidence. 20 Surely this is not a prohibitive requirement for law
enforcement officers. This decision will curb potential abuses of police power
by requiring officers to "think twice" as to the existence of probable cause
and the opportunity to procure a warrant. At the same time such procedure
will retain adequate leeway, when necessity requires, for officers to conduct
vehicular searches without a warrant.
Neither the fourth amendment nor section 22 of the Florida Declaration
of Rights states that a search cannot be made without a warrant if it is reasonably practicable to procure one. "The relevant test is not whether it is
reasonable to procure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." 21 Yet the reasonableness of the vehicular search cannot depend on the
finding of probable cause subsequent to the search. In all likelihood, many
searches of vehicles on alleged probable cause have revealed nothing, and some
motorists have been delayed and harassed unduly. Requiring a warrant where
reasonably practicable would curb these unnecessary searches and encourage
independent judicial determinations as to the existence of probable cause.
But the Carter decision, while it tightens the requirements for vehicular
searches, lays down no readily ascertainable standards as to what constitutes
"reasonable opportunity, both in point of time and circumstances" to procure
a warrant. Subsequent cases will have to supply the necessary guidelines.
Thus, uncertainty exists for police officers not only whether probable cause
exists but also whether reasonable opportunity exists for procuring a search
warrant. However, the fact that the Carter opinion encourages resort to the
courts to resolve the uncertainty in both respects is more in line with the
mandate of the fourth amendment and retains as paramount the public
interest in protection from unreasonable searches.
R.

20.
21.

BRUCE CARRUTHERS

199 So. 2d 324, 334 (2d D.CA. Fla. 1967).
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 59, 66 (1950).
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